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This book reduces the extraordinarily complicated history of the Guomindang's 
(GMD) rise to power in the 1920s to a contest between two impulses that evolved together 
within the revolutionary movement. The party employed what Michael Murdock' labels 
"dual-prong" tactics to undermine its opponents. One prong was mass organization and 
anti-imperialist/anti-warlord agitation. When unleashed it could be difficult to control, but 
it could also be used'to maneuver party opponents into positions of weakness relative to 
the party. The other prong was accommodation: a willingness to negotiate compromises 
with the party's enemies in order to take advantage of the weaknesses that mass agitation 
had revealed. As Murdock amply demonstrates, party leaders were on many occasions 
able to employ both prongs interchangeably, even simultaneously, fomenting mass agita-
tion in order to pressure their enemies into seeking accommodation, and accommodating 
their enemies in order to consolidate the gains they had made through agitation. 
The book is aimed at countering a set of narratives about political conflict in Republi-
can China that reduce the subject to what Murdock considers a simplistic binary code that 
emphasizes left/right distinctions. This "faction-centered paradigm" has dominated stan-
dard interpretations of 20th-century history essentially because people on either side of the 
Communist Party/Guomindang political divide have found it in their interests to create 
narratives that present clean factional divisions. The result, Murdock argues, has been the 
popular impression that the 1927 split between the left and right wings of the GMD repre-
sents the triumph of reactionary, anti-mass forces against populist activism: Chinese 
Communists, their Soviet advisors, and GMD leftists pursued a revolutionary agenda that 
involved mass organization and agitation, while the right wing of the party followed an 
anti-communist trajectory that at times allied it with warlord and imperialist forces and led 
it to oppose the masses. According to Murdock, the problem with such an interpretation is 
that it assumes that the two factions had radically different agendas. In fact, however, 
when viewed in the light of the tactics they used, both the left and the right were moving 
toward a common objective: the construction of a strong, centralized state under one-party 
domination. Both wings of the GMD had as their short-term objective the seizure of 
supreme power, and each of them was capable of employing "dual-prong" tactics in order 
to advance their state-building goals. Party leaders on either pole were determined to 
establish their supremacy by building a strongly centralized party-state. Paradoxically, 
however, both the highly fragmented political climate and the rise of anti-foreign national-
istic sentiments that characterized life in China during the 1920s provided ample fuel for 
mass agitation, and party leaders responded by using agitative tactics to maneuver their 
foreign and domestic enemies into positions of weakness. 
The use of agitation was always risky. Popular organizations and mass campaigns 
could develop beyond party control and either provoke dangerous foreign reactions or 
threaten the political and economic interests of factions on which the party depended. As 
Murdock puts it, sometimes the GMD leadership seemed to be operating "with the same 
precision as firefighters trying to manage a forest fire in shifting cross winds." (p. 284) 
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Nevertheless, though they acted for the most part in an ad hoc fashion, party leaders on 
the whole performed remarkably well a balancing act that required considerable skill. 
Murdoch's theory rests on an assumption that in warlord China two opposing strands 
of nationalism evolved side by side and mirrored the two prongs that were employed by 
GMD tacticians. One strand defined the nation in narrow, exclusionary terms and seemed 
designed to give party leaders tight control of the emerging state; the other was a broader, 
more inclusive concept that was aimed at attracting mass support. The inclusive approach 
led to mass organization and agitative tactics; the exclusive one inclined toward statist or 
centralizing policies that suppressed organizations attempting to mobilize the political 
energies of the people broadly defined. Politicians on either side of the left/right divide 
used each of these approaches at will, with the result that in practice the state-builders 
employed a complex and "unique revolutionary blend" of tactics. 
The book builds on pioneering studies of John Fitzgerald and Prasenjit Duara that raise 
questions about what nationalist Chinese actually meant by nationalism, and it adds sig-
nificantly to work of C. Martin Wilbur, Michael Tsin, and others who have done much to 
explore the party-building efforts of GMD leaders in the 1920s. Richly detailed and me-
ticulously documented, this work adds substantially to our understanding of Republican 
China's political history. 
Sacred Heart University Thomas D. Curran 
J AH 42/1(2008) 
